这篇文章发表在去年夏天的香港《南华早报》上，引起了学界和政界的很大反响。因为作者沃尔夫教授和中国官方一直有政策咨询方面的良好合作关系，中国国务院还特别印发此文进行开会讨论。奇怪的是，我在中文网上却一直找不到译文。自己又懒得翻译，就先找来一个摘要，给懒读英文的大侠们看个大概吧。

转的这个摘要有一点不精确：沃尔夫原文是说：八大隐患一起发作的可能性固然不大，但八个隐患一个也不发作，可能性也很小。并且一个隐患的发作很可能会引发另外几个的爆发。

我把英文全文也附在下面。沃尔夫的同名著作已经由兰德出版，我记得在兰德网站上可以下载全书的PDF版本。

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美国智库兰德公司（RAND Corporation）资深经济学顾问查尔斯．沃夫(Charles Wolf)强调了中国经济发展进程中的八大障碍：（1）高失业率、贫穷和社会不稳定；（2）贪污所引起的负面经济影响；（3）艾滋病等流行疾病危机；（4）水资源缺乏与污染；（5）能源消费量与价格持续上升；（6）金融机制与国有企业体制的脆弱性；（7）可能会减少的外商直接投资；（8）可能会发生的台海军事冲突。根据查尔斯的研究，上述任何一项危机都可能导致中国年均国民生产总值下降0.3到2.2个百分点。而且，这些因素彼此相关，任何一个情况的发生都有可能引起其他方面也随之恶化。查尔斯认为，以上若干种情形同时在中国发生的可能性还是相当大的。

卢 咏，《华盛顿观察》周刊（Washington Observer weekly）
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Commentary
Fault Lines
Eight Threats to China's Economic Miracle

By Charles Wolf


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This opinion article appeared in the South China Morning Post on August 7, 2003.
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Among the four so-called "economic miracles" of the past half century—Germany after the second world war, Japan in the 1970s and 1980s, South Korea in the 1970s through to the mid-1990s, and China between 1980 and the present day—that of China has been the most remarkable.

For example, China's average annual economic growth has been 8.6 per cent, well in excess of the 5 per cent recorded by Japan in the 1970s and 1980s. If China can sustain this, by 2025, its gross domestic product (GDP) would be only a little below that of the United States, although its per capita product would still be less than 15 per cent of that of the US. But there is an array of "fault lines"—obstacles which could seriously hinder this rosy scenario. A RAND study, Fault Lines in China's Economic Terrain, focuses on eight potential threats that are considered especially serious. While many have been confronted and adequately managed in the past, certain adverse scenarios could seriously impede, if not reverse, China's buoyant economic performance.

These eight fault lines, together with rough estimates of how they might reduce China's annual economic growth, are: first, unemployment, poverty and social unrest. Total unemployment amounts to more than 20 per cent of the workforce, or about 170 million people. This is largely due to population growth in the 1980s, privatisation and the downsizing of inefficient state-owned enterprises, and the effects of China's efforts to comply with its World Trade Organisation commitments. Rural poverty is accompanied by increased income inequality between rural and urban areas, by rural-to-urban migration, rising urban unemployment and social unrest. A worsening of these circumstances could cause a reduction of between 0.3 and 0.8 per cent in China's annual growth during the coming decade.

Second, corruption. Pervasive corruption could set back growth by distorting resource allocations. Were corrupt practices to worsen, China's position would decline in the country indexes that link economic growth with the prevalence of corruption. Such a shift could reduce the expected annual growth rate by perhaps 0.5 per cent.

Third, HIV/AIDS and epidemic disease. It is estimated that between 600,000 and 1.3 million people are infected with HIV/AIDS, with an annual rate of increase of between 20 and 30 per cent. Plausible projections of these trends would seriously affect China's economic growth through the cost of treatment, and reductions in productivity. "Intermediate" rather than "pessimistic" scenarios predict annual deaths from HIV/AIDS of between 1.7 and 2.7 million in the second decade of the 21st century. This could lead to annual reductions in GDP growth of between 1.8 and 2.2 per cent, up to 2015. The incidence of Sars and other epidemics could further impede growth.

Fourth, water resources and pollution. China is beset by water distribution problems. North China, with more than 33 per cent of its population, has only 7.5 per cent of naturally available water supplies. South China, typically, has an abundance of supplies, sometimes accompanied by serious flooding. Pollution discharges from industrial and other sources aggravate the shortage of water for consumers and industry in the north. Growth will be significantly affected by whether policymakers push for less efficient, capital-intensive water-transfer projects from south to north, or opt for more efficient recycling, as well as conservation, in the north. If economically inefficient policy decisions are made, China's annual GDP growth would be reduced by 1.5 to 1.9 per cent in the coming decade.

Fifth, energy consumption and prices. China has shifted from being a net exporter of oil in the early 1990s to importing nearly half its oil, and nearly a fifth of its natural gas supplies. The major risk posed for sustained growth in the energy sector depends on oil and gas prices, rather than on the share of imports in total energy consumption. A sharp increase, lasting a decade, would mean a reduction in growth of between 1.2 and 1.4 per cent.

Sixth, fragility of the financial system and state-owned enterprises. The fragility of China's state-dominated financial institutions is suggested by the high volume of non-performing loans on the balance sheets of the four major state banks. Estimates of total non-performing loans vary enormously, but they may amount to more than 60 per cent of China's GDP. China could experience a panic bank "run", large-scale capital flight, a significant reduction in savings and a decline in capital formation. The ensuing financial crisis and credit squeeze could lower annual GDP growth by at least 0.5 to 1 per cent.

Seventh, possible shrinkage of foreign direct investment (FDI). In the past 15 years, China has experienced a steadily rising volume of annual FDI, reaching US$50 billion (HK$390 billion) last year, significantly boosting growth. Adverse internal developments include possible future tension following the leadership succession, the possibility of a financial crisis and the inconvertibility of the yuan; external impedance might result from improvements in the investment climate in Eastern Europe, Russia, Indonesia, India and other countries that compete for foreign capital. A sustained reduction of US$10 billion a year in FDI may result in a reduction in annual GDP growth of 0.6 to 1.6 per cent.

Finally, Taiwan and other potential conflicts. Although cross-strait relations are currently relatively benign, it is conceivable that tensions might escalate into conflict, with growth-inhibiting consequences for resource allocations, exchange rates and equity markets. The bottom line could be a decline in annual growth of between 1 and 1.3 per cent.

Were all these scenarios to occur, China's annual growth would be reduced by between 7.4 and 10.7 per cent. While the probability of them all happening at once is extremely low, the chance that none will occur is also low. And if one scenario happens, it would become more likely that others would ensue as well. For example, an internal financial crisis would very likely have a negative impact on FDI, unemployment and corruption.

The ramifications of these eight fault lines are likely to extend into all levels of Chinese society, government and party structure. To mitigate the ensuing stresses will demand an enormous set of consultations, negotiations and transactions among central and provincial governments, and the party apparatus—which will probably preoccupy China's leaders in the next decade, predisposing them to avoid external distractions.


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Charles Wolf is senior economic adviser and corporate fellow at RAND and a senior research fellow at the Hoover Institution.
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